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lntbe

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
N'PATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
-vs.TO~I~fY"

DANKS,

Appellant.

I
~

Case No. 9127

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELI~1INARY STATE~1ENT

Reference in respondent's brief to the transcript of
proceedings will be designated by the letter "T" and to
appellant's brief by the letter "B."

STATE)1ENT OF FACTS
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's
notation of the facts which were not in dispute but would
question the characterization by appellant's Brief, of
~Ir. N e'vbold's condition as "highly intoxicated" and his
drinking as "heavy."
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
POIN1T II.
STATE'S EXHIBIT "B" WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE.
POINT III.
STATE'S EXHIBIT ''C'' WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE.

ARGU!1:ENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.

Appellant correctly states the law to be that when a
jury has resolved inconsistent and conflicting testimony
and ·made a determination of facts based thereon, it is not
the province of an appellate court to alter such determination. Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co·., 5 U. 2d 187, 299
P.2d 622; State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547:
State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805.
Appellant seeks to escape the weight of this rule
by claiming the testimony of the State's witnesses, which
conflicted with his own, was inherently improbable and
hence provides a basis for this Court to re-examine such
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evidence as to weight and reverse the jury verdict which
was based thereon.
l~espondent

strongly denies that the evidence of the
prosecution was inherently irnprobable and asserts no
basis for reversal is thereby provided. Since the
(1uestion of credibility necessarily involves an examination of sufficiency as well, respondent will treat the two
together and shovv that the evidence of the State at trial
\Va8 both fully probable and entirely sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
The narration of ~Ir. Newbold, the victim, supported
b~T the testin1ony of Mr. McCollum and the Officers, detailed a plausible, credible series of events culminating
in the crirne of robbery. Mr. Newbold testified that while
in appellant's apartment after an evening of drinking and
socializing, appellant struck him, held him at knife point
and forced him to give up his wallet whereupon, on appellant's orders, Mr. McCollum removed the money from
the \vallet and gave it to appellant. (T. 6). The testimony
of !1r. 1fcCollum substantiates the details of the robbery
including his own actions. (T. 39, 40). Mr. Newbold further testified he was again forced to give up his wallet,
whereupon appellant cut it in two. (T. 7). The knife and
the n1utilated wallet were placed in evidence. The police
officers testified to Mr. N ewhold's injured condition
w·hen he reported to them, ( T. 56), to being given the
\Vallet in its severed condition by ~Ir. Newbold (T. 50) and
to finding the knife in the front room of appellant's apartment. (T. 51, 54, 55).
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The test of inherent improbability of evidence has
been well outlined in the case of People v. Moreno, 79
P.2d 390, 26 C.A. 2d 334 1937, wherein it was stated:
"Unless the appellate court can say that the
testimony is so obviously and inherently improbable as to leave the court no recourse without selfstultification, except to reverse the judgment, the
reviewing court should not interfere with the verdict and the judgment. * * *"
The court goes on to say that contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses alone will not constitute inherent improbability.
It is with this in mind that appellant's claim of conflicts indicating inherent improbability must be examined.
Appellant first cites the conflict as to the amount
of money Mr. Newbold had at the time of the robbery.
Mr. Newbold testified he had between $30.00 and $40.00
when the crilne occurred. ( T. 7). He also testified that
he began the evening with $35.00, that he asked his wife
for an additional $20.00 (T. 9) and later borrowed $20.00
more from his employer. (T. 13-14).
Appellant places great stress on the fact Mr. Newbold is alleged to have stated he had only $5.00 left prior
to getting $20.00 from his employer (B. 5), in an attempt
to show he could not have then had $30.00 to $40.00 at the
evening's end. However, although Mr. Newbold stated
he may have made such a statement to a companion, Mr.
Gray, he further testified that he in fact had more than
$5.00 at that time. (T. 14). Is it "inherently improbable"
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that the witness may not have wanted Mr. Gray to know
his exact financial status for some reason~ We think not.
At page 6 of his brief, appellant stresses that Mr.
G-ray's testimony "established the fact" that Newbold
had no money in his wallet and only $5.00 in change prior
to acquiring $20.00 from his employer, and refers to
pages 77-78 of the transcript. Examination of these pages
reveals first that the time Gray sawNewbold's wallet was
long after the employer incident and that Gray's testimony "\Vas as follows:
"A.

* * * And Bill had his billfold _out on the table
with all his papers scattered out there.

Q. What do you mean by 'papers'~
A. Well his driver's license and stuff. All the
papers that was in the wallet was scattered
out there on the table and he was looking for
some money. And this was just, I would say,
about-oh, 30 seconds before I left. And being I was sober, I just naturally glanced at
him as he was looking at the papers, and I
couldn't see any.
Q. Any what~
A. Any money at all. And so I figured the only
money he had left was the dollar and whatever change he had in his pocket." (Emphasis added). (Tr. 78).
Gray goes on to again make a reference to the $5.00
shown him earlier prior to the employer's $20.00 loan.
(T. 78).
The incident with the wallet did not take place
just before Newbold saw his employer but was con-
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siderably later as Gray also testified that the $20.00
loan occurred between 6:30 and 8:00, (T. 74-75), and
that he left Newbold "about 20 minutes to 12.00" (T. 79).
The above testimony is totally inadequate to establish the amount of money Newbold possessed near midnight. There was clear uncontested evidence that he
had a total of $75.00 early in the evening, and the fact
that Gray "couldn't see any" about 12 P.M. does not
prove it was not there. State's Exhibit A, Newbold's
wallet, is a multisectional one with two separate compartments for currency, one with a zipper, and four
other compartments where folded currency could be
placed. All these would effectively hide currency from
sight. Also Newbold could have had undetermined
amounts of money on his person in pockets of clothing
which could later have been transferred to the wallet.
This too would have been hidden from Gray's sight.
The last item of testimony appellant claims conflicts with Newbold's estimate of his financial status
is that of Dennis ~IcCollum wherein he stated the
Newbold wallet had no money in it. (T. 45). However,
pages 39-40 of the transcript reveal McCollum testified
that on app·ellant's orders Newbold took his 'vallet out
and threw it on the floor and that also on appellant's
orders he, McCollum, took $30.00 from the wallet and
gave it to appellant. Newbold also testified (T. 6~7) that
appellant ordered the wallet taken out and thrown on
the floor a second time after the money had been
removed.
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With this background McCollum's testilnony at page
T. -l-~l does not reveal as to which time the witness
has reference, in his own mind, when he stated there
\va~ no 1noney in the wallet.
Appellant's second contention of conflict creating
inherent improbability concerns certain discrepancies
concerning the robbery itself between Newbold's testiInony at trial, his statement to the police and his testitnony at the preliminary hearing and a clarification
on cross-examination of his testimony as to actually
seeing his money removed from the wallet prior to
seeing it handed to appellant. To this appellant adds
his O"\Vn denial of the testimony against him and offers
his explanation of the occurrences of that evening.
It is beyond doubt that some discrepancy did exist
and that appellant and his wife offered testimony
directly in conflict with that of the State's witnesses.
Ho,vever, it has been held, as noted above, that discrepancies and conflicts in the testimony of a ·witness
are Inatters which affect the credibility of that witness
and the weight to be given his testimony, and are properly matters for the jury's determination. State v. Jarrett, State v. Lau.b, su-pra.
It is clear that discrepancies In testimony and
conflicting testimony from various witnesses fall far
short of the test outlined in the Moreno case and are
not sufficient to disturb the findings of a jury who
\vas present, heard each witness and was hence able
to evaluate the testimony given. The jury in the instant
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case was undoubtedly aware of these discrepancies and
conflicts and was properly instructed thereon by the
Court in Instruction No. 9 (T. 115 and 116). The jury
then resolved the conflicts, believing the State's witnesses and not believing those of appellant. It must
be remembered that every lawsuit is, by its very nature,
fraught with conflicting testimony, and there must always be determination as to which is true.
It is clear that appellant has also failed to meet
the test of sufficiency set out by this Court in State v.
Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212:

"* * * to prevail on that proposition it must
appear that, viewing the evidence and all fair
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
reasonable minds could not believe them guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt * * *."
POINT II.
STATE'S EXHIBIT "B" WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE.

Appellant specifically stated there was no objection
to this exhibit at the time it was introduced in evidence,
(T. 69) and failure to do so at that time precludes
raising such issue on appeal. 3 Am. Jur. 29 states:
"Where a party has the option to object or
not as he sees fit, the failu,re to exercise the
option when the opportunity therefor presents
itself must, in fairness to the court and to the
adverse party, be held either to constitute a
waiver of the right to object, or to raise an
estoppel against the subsequent exercise thereof."
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And at page 89 it states:
Hin order to present to the appellate court
the question of the propriety of the admission
of evidence it is necessary that there should
have been an objection thereto. * * *"
Even assuming the point to be properly raised, an
investigation of the record reveals that on page 37
of the transcript the following testimony of Mr. Newbold
is recorded, first during re-direct examination by the
State, and second during a re-cross examination by
the defense attorney.
"REDIRECT EXAMINATION.

Q. Do you know where that knife was at that
time Mr. Newbold~
A. At the time I threw the wallet out there~
Q. Yes.
A. In my ribs.
RECROSS EXAMINATION.

Q. You have seen this

knife~

Have you seen It

since~

A. Yes.

Q. Since this
A. Yes.

happened~

Q. You were shown and asked if this was the
knife, and you said it was~
A. Yes.
Q. When was this~
A. At the preliminary hearing.
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Q.

A.

That's the first time you'd seen it since the
night this happened~
Yes, sir."

Mr. l\fcCollum testified (T. 40) as follows:

"Q. Have you seen either the wallet or the knife
since the happening of the event * * * ~
A. Yes.
Q.

Where~

A.

At the preliminary hearing.

Q.

Which item did you

see~

Or did you see them

both~

A.

I seen them both."

Finally, Officer Butcher testified he took the knife,
Exhibit B, from the front room of appellant's home at
the time of the arrest, a few hours after the robbery,
and that it remained in police custody until the preliminary hearing. ( T. 54, 55).
This testimony was fully sufficient to identify the
knife as that used in the crime, and the exhibit was
properly received in evidence.
POINT III.
STATE'S EXHIBIT ''C'' WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE.

Appellant first contends State's Exhibit C, the partially severed ten dollar bill, was not properly identified
in that only the officer who discovered the bill in the
possession of appellant's wife and took it into custody
made the identification.
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'Ve submit that no more complete identification
\vas possible or necessary. The officer testified the bill
was in fact the one he found among the contents of
1\'lrs. Danks' purse on the night in question and went
on to describe the circurnstances of its discovery (T.
49, 50). It is, of course, most difficult to identify with
ePrtainty a specific piece of currency; however, the
officer was able to recognize this one because "It was
ahnost severed in two." ( T. 49). The ten dollar bill,
having been fully identified, was properly received in
evidence, its probative value for the jury to deteTmine.
\Vhile the fact that the wife of a party accused
of robbery did have some currency with her of the same
denornination as part of that taken is in no way conclusive and may well be explained away, it does have
so1ne probative weight, as would a showing that she
had no such currency have some probative weight vvith
an opposite effect. Detennination of the implications
and value of such evidence are properly a jury function.
Appellant cites the case of People v. Morgan, 321
P.2d 873, 157 C.A.2d 756, to support his claim that
failure to tie the currency directly to him was a fatal
fla\Y in the State's case, and he was prejudiced thereby.
In the Morgan case, a narcotics sale conviction, the
only items of demonstrative evidence, the heroin packets,
\\Tere never connected to the defendant in any way and
further the procurer of the evidence did not testify
at all, hence the finding that a fatal gap existed i_n
the State's case, as there was no direct connection of
the defendant with the crime. That situation is clearlv
•-'
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distinguishable from the instant case where the jury
heard two eye witnesses, saw the knife, and heard
testimony as to the victim's condition. The State did
not rely solely on the ten dollar bill to support its
case, and the .admission of the currency was proper
and without prejudicial effect upon appellant.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the admission had
technically been error, it cannot be said to have been
prejudicial when view in the light of the mass of
evidence against the appellant.
"A judgment will not be reversed because
of the erroneous admission of evidence, where
it did not, or probably did not, affect the result,
conclusion, judgment, or verdict or could not
have done so,***." (5A C.J.S. 945).
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·CONCLUSION
Appellant's charge that the evidence was so Inherently improbable as to be unbelievable is based
only on discrepancies and conflicting testimony which
the jury, fulfilling their traditional function, have laid
to rest. Their determination, fully supported, as it is
by substantial evidence, should not be disturbed.
Further the admission of State's Exhibits "B" and
.. C" was, in all respects proper and free of error. Appellant's conviction should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTE.R L. BUD·GE
.Attorney General
RICHARD R. BOYLE
Assistant Attorne.y General

Attorneys for Respondent
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